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Abstract
Assuming that a North-South transfer is the key to climate cooperation, we ask when and how
much the North should o⁄er to the South in return for a commitment to reduce deforestation and
forest degradation. In light of the risk of irreversible damage over time, we examine a negotiation
with a deadline. We assess the conditions for an agreement to be immediate or delayed, and
discuss situations likely to result in negotiation failure. Despite the risk of irreversible damage
over time, we show that cooperation is likely to be delayed and characterize situations where
North and South fail to agree within the deadline. Although Pareto-improving, cooperation may
collapse because of ine¢ ciencies related to incomplete information. We show that in negotiations
with a deadline, uncertainty about the bene￿ts deriving from cooperation and the irreversibility
of the damage that will be caused if cooperation is delayed, are the two key components a⁄ecting
choice.
Keywords: climate treaty, deforestation, bargaining, transfer, timing, irreversibility, dis-
counting.
Journal of Economic Literature Classi￿cation: C72, K32, K42, Q56.
1 Introduction
Deforestation and forest degradation account for nearly 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions, a
level that is second only to the energy sector (UN-REDD 2011)1. That makes it practically impossible
to stabilize global average temperatures within two degrees Celsius without the forest sector that is,
without the participation of the so-called G77 South coalition. North-South cooperation is a major
issue in climate negotiations and con￿ icts during and after rati￿cation of the Kyoto protocol have
￿INRA, UMR 1135 LAMETA, F-34000 Montpellier, France. email: courtois@supagro.inra.fr
yCNRS, UMR 8568 CIRED, F-94736 Nogent - France. email: tazdait@centre-cired.fr
1These documents are available on the o¢ cial United Nations website dedicated to the REDD mechanism, see
www.un-redd.org.
1made clear that problems related to burden sharing are the principal impediment to cooperation.
In early 2001, the US senate passed unanimously the Byrd-Hagel resolution according to which
￿the United States should not be a signatory to any Protocol that excludes developing countries from
legally binding commitments".2 Developing countries for their part, argued that their minor historical
contribution to global warming and their right to develop, exempts them from costly e⁄orts. The
outcome was the enforcement of a Kyoto protocol a minima, that is, a treaty without the principal
producers of greenhouse gases.
The REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) negotiations that
began in Bali in 2007 and that continued during the Copenhagen and Cancun climate summits in
2009-2010, brought the North-South deal back to the negotiating table. REDD provides a mechanism
aimed at creating a ￿nancial value for the carbon stored in forests, and o⁄ers pecuniary incentives
to developing countries for reducing emissions from forested lands. North and South have a common
interest in achieving cooperation - the North being interested in a low cost carbon policy, the South
in being paid in order to provide climate protection. However, the parties interests are not well
aligned: the North would prefer a small transfer while South is seeking a signi￿cant reward. The
UN predicts that the ￿nancial ￿ ow from REDD+ could reach up to US$30 billion a year (UN-REDD
2011). The design of the mechanism is still not de￿nitive and the question of how much, to where
and when to transfer is still being negotiated.3
The focus in this paper is how much the North should transfer and when. We assume that the
North can adopt a tough or a soft strategy, and o⁄er a small or a big transfer to the South. A generous
o⁄er would ensure immediate cooperation to halt deforestation, while a small o⁄er would introduce
the risk of agreement being postponed. For the North, the choice relies on the balance between the
2http://www.nationalcenter.org/KyotoSenate.html
3This is anecdotal but note that the US$250 millions transfer o⁄er from Norway to Guyana in order to protect the
entirety of the latter￿ s remaining forest cover as a giant carbon o⁄set is still frozen after four years of negotiations and
one year after the signing of a formal comprehensive agreement. Guyana￿ s President Bharrat Jagdeo complained in
Cancun that Guyana had "not seen a single cent expended as yet...".
2cost of a transfer policy and the potential irreversible damage that would occur if cooperation is not
achieved. This is di¢ cult to assess because the speed of climate change, the associated damage, and
the willingness of the South to engage in a binding commitment are uncertain.
To analyse the bargaining process between North and South, we use a repeated o⁄er model.
Considering a ￿nite two stage negotiation, we assume that North could propose a high, a median or
a low o⁄er in the ￿rst period. Cooperation could be achievable with a small amount of aid, but if the
o⁄er is too low, South may reject it and any agreement would be postponed to the next negotiation
period. We characterize the equilibrium set of the bargaining game and discuss key decision variables
in North adopting a wait and see policy involving a small amount of aid and observing how South
reacts.
The related literature is on international cooperation and the making of international agreements.
It examines coalitions likely to emerge at equilibrium, with transfers conceived as a mechanism to
ensure coalition stability.4 There are two approaches within this literature: the small versus the grand
stable coalition (Tulkens 1998). The latter adopts the analytical framework of endogenous coalition
formation (which combines cooperative and non-cooperative concepts) and puts transfer at the heart
of the problem. Initially proposed in Chander and Tulkens (1995,1997) the main achievement in
this approach is de￿nition of transfer schemes allowing a stable grand coalition to be pro￿table
for all. Although this approach proposes a transfer rule, it does not describe how agreements are
reached. This is the principal purpose in the former approach which adopts a non-cooperative game
framework to focus on the self-enforceability of agreements. Transfers are analysed as a way to
resolve free riding. Carraro and Siniscalco￿ s (1993) seminal paper introduced this idea and making
a commitment hypothesis, they show that transfers can enlarge the size of a cooperative coalition.
Closely related to the main question addressed in the current paper, Barrett (2001) and Fuentes-
Albero and Rubio (2010) ask whether cooperation can be bought. Barrett (2001) considers two
4Exhaustive surveys of this literature can be found in Finus (2008) and Jorgensen et al. (2010).
3types of countries that di⁄er in terms of their bene￿ts, and proves that cooperation can be bought
via a transfer. Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) generalize this result to an asymmetric countries
setting that di⁄ers in terms of both bene￿ts and costs. Their main conclusion is that transfers
increase participation, especially when asymmetries are strong. However, they say nothing about the
bargaining procedure involved. To complement these works, we explore the negotiation process. We
consider that both North and South have incentives to arrive at an agreement. We assume Pareto
improving transfer rules exist and agreement is enforced only if the two coalitions involved in the
negotiation agree to be part of it. In other words, rather than focusing on stability, pro￿tability and
how transfers a⁄ect countries incentives to be part of a treaty, we discuss the bargaining that takes
place over that transfer.
Although they do not analyze timing, Rotillon et al. (1996) and Caparros et al. (2004) examine
North-South bargaining employing the strategic approach de￿ned in Rubinstein (1982). They model
a multi-period game between heterogeneous coalitions with diverging interests. Our approach di⁄ers
from theirs in three main ways. First, Rotillon et al. (1996) and Caparros et al. (2004) analyse
bargaining within an in￿nite horizon. Coalitions cannot threaten the partner with a negotiation
failure in the following stage. However, following failures in negotiations over rati￿cation of the Kyoto
protocol at the Conference Of the Parties (COP6) in the Hague in 2000, the Marakesh conference
(COP7) in 2001 was held with the threat of a negotiation dead end. Similarly, negotiations in the
Cancun summit (COP16, 2010), which followed the failure of the Copenhagen conference (COP15,
2009) to agree on the design of a post-2012 climate treaty, took place in the context of a threat
that the framework convention on climate change might collapse.5 For this reason we include a time
constraint - a deadline for negotiations that takes account of the ultimatum e⁄ect of a negotiation
5Several newspaper articles referred to this threat; for example refer to articles entitle"as threat grows, UN talks face
failure" ( Sydney Morning Herald, 8 of August 2010), "Why failure of climate summit would herald global catastrophe:
3.5
￿C" (The Independent, 31 of August 2010 ) or "Copenhagen climate deal: Spectacular failure - or a few important
steps?" published december the 22nd, 2009 in the Guardian.
4failure. Second, our approach di⁄ers in the utility functions considered. We assume time is costly in
the sense that the longer countries wait, the worse the damage will be. The sooner cooperation is
achieved, the better it will be for the environment. This illustrates an important property of climate
change (Parry et al. 2007) and a fundamental variable in considerations of timing. Third, while
the two papers referred above consider o⁄er-counter o⁄er models, we assume that only North makes
o⁄ers, which South accepts or not. Our model is a repeated o⁄er bargaining model in the sense of
Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and Sobel and Takahashi (1983). We believe this modelling alternative
is more appropriate given that in the REDD+ negotiations, South is passive about the amount of the
o⁄er and bargains mostly over the design of the mechanism. It would be of little relevance to assume
that South would risk negotiation failure by asking for a ￿xed transfer ￿ ow to pay for the opportunity
value of its forest. Conversely and in light of the irreversible damage that accumulates over time,
North may make a take it or leave it o⁄er if agreement is not reached at a given period of time.
Considering this ultimatum e⁄ect might be an important dimension of North-South bargaining.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the model and the strategy
and information structure. Second, we characterize the outcomes and examine the transfer schemes
that could emerge from the bargaining process. We study the payo⁄structure and discuss conditions
for the North to adopt a wait and see policy. We conclude with a discussion on the main conditions
a⁄ecting negotiation timing and negotiation failure. To help the readability of this paper, most proofs
are relegated to the appendix.
6Note that in contrast to a repeated ultimatum game, in our setting the North is far from having full power in
this negotiation. The assumption of irreversible damage makes our game one of ￿a melting ice cake￿and ￿nds more
analogies with a reverse ultimatum game (Gneezy, Haruvy and Roth, 2003). If South rejects an o⁄er it knows that
North￿ s bene￿t will melt.
52 The model
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider two heterogeneous coalitions7 denoted by subscript i, with i = fN;Sg; North and South.
Each coalition speaks with in a single voice and chooses a level of e⁄ort ei in order to limit a public
bad, the environmental degradations caused by climate change. E⁄orts to limit this public bad is
assumed to be substitutable, and we use E to denote the aggregate e⁄ort level E =
P
i ei. This e⁄ort
bene￿ts each coalition asymmetrically and is individually costly. When the aggregate e⁄ort level is
E up to period t, coalition i gets Bi(ei;t) = Di(ei;e￿i;t) ￿ Ci(ei;t) where Di stands for the avoided
damage function and Ci is the cost function associated with the individual e⁄ort level ei made over
the t periods. Both function is increasing and twice di⁄erentiable.
The two coalitions di⁄er. Marginal costs in the South are small compared to the North. Because
e⁄ort is a public good, both coalitions have an incentive to underprovide it. However, based on reasons
of responsibility and ethics, the South free rides while the countries comprising the North coalition
have agreed on a common environmental policy, an average e⁄ort eN, for example the Kyoto target.
We assume that South is even less concerned about the e⁄orts that its perception of the relative value
of damages compared to costs is low. Without transfer South adopts a business-as-usual policy eS,
which may well mean no e⁄ort. Normalizing, we assume that following a business-as-usual policy,
BS(eN;eS;t) = 0:
Because the marginal cost in the South is small, we consider the bargaining between North
and South over the design of a transfer mechanism for the South to make a given level of e⁄ort
eS > eS. For example, North bargains over a ￿nancial ￿ ow to the South to avoid deforestation and
forest degradation. Maximizing bene￿ts over the two control variables ei and e￿i, North receives an
additional bene￿t which we denote by B; where B = BN(e￿
N;eS;1)￿BN(eN;eS;t) > 0; BN(e￿
N;eS;1)
7Note that we use the term coalition to be consistent with the terminology used in the literature. In this paper,
coalitions cannot split and the term refers to a group of countries.
6representing the bene￿t North receives if South agrees to stop deforestation from the ￿rst period,
BN(eN;eS;t) representing the bene￿t associated with business as usual over the t periods. For
simplicity, we also normalize the business-as-usual payo⁄to zero and we denote the additional bene￿t
B. At the ￿rst period, the North is willing to o⁄er a transfer amount ￿ 2 [0;B] for the South to
perform e⁄ort eS. Although avoiding climate change is desirable for the South, e⁄ort eS involves a net
cost, BS(e￿
N;eS;1) < 0. Deforestation and forest degradation is an asset that is even more valuable
because North is willing to pay to stop it. We assume that depending on the costs and bene￿ts to
preserve the forest but also on the compensation the South expects due to North￿ s responsibility
in global warming, South claims for a minimum payment c in order to make e⁄ort eS; with c ￿
￿BS(e￿
N;eS;1).
The objective of the bargaining is to reach an agreement on the value of the transfer ￿ that North
grants to South to halt deforestation. This agreement translates into a mutually acceptable transfer
￿ at time t for South to make the e⁄ort eS. Although North and South bene￿t from limiting climate
change, their interests con￿ ict: North prefers a low ￿ whereas the South prefers a high one.
Time is an important feature of the problem because in the case of disagreement, negotiations
will be postponed to the next period, involving irreversible additional degradation. We consider
that this expected degradation ￿i increases linearly with time, ￿N and ￿S are net degradations that
accumulate. Because of this degradation, South may either ask for a higher transfer in order to
compensate it or accept to join the agreement at a lower price because of the additional damages.
We consider the former case in most of the paper and discuss the latter in the concluding section.
Time is important also because coalitions discount the future. We consider they discount it uniformly
at rate ￿ 2 [0;1]:
If we focus on the bargaining problem, the objective functions of North and South can be written
as:
7(
UN(￿;t) = ￿t￿1 [B ￿ ￿N(t ￿ 1) ￿ ￿t]
US(￿;t) = ￿t￿1 [￿t ￿ ￿S(t ￿ 1) ￿ c]
North￿ s utility is greater the bigger is the net bene￿t B￿￿t of an agreement on avoided deforestation,
and the faster the agreement is reached. Conversely, South￿ s utility is all the greater that the transfer
is high and the opportunity cost of deforestation is low. Like North, South is subject to irreversible
degradation in the case that agreement is postponed and prefers immediate cooperation.
2.2 Strategies and information structure
Coalitions know that negotiations take place in a ￿nite sequence of two periods. Although a general
model with T periods might be desirable in theory, we reject this feature for two reasons. First,
because considering two periods allows for a complete characterization of the equilibrium set. This
is not case when considering T periods because more periods involves more equilibria. Multiplicity
arises because perfect Bayesian equilibrium imposes no restrictions on players￿beliefs following out-
of-equilibrium moves. It follows that considering more periods translates into adding restrictions to
the model in order to be able to focus on particular equilibria, as in Sobel and Takahashi (1983) and
Rubinstein (1985). Second, because climate change negotiation period runs basically over 10 years
and a two stage setting is a likely scenario. At the end of the 1990s, countries were bargaining over
a climate treaty for the period 2000-2012, they are currently bargaining over the second negotiating
period and it is reasonable to assume that if North-South cooperation fails, another agreement will
be negotiated within another ten years. In case cooperation fails at that point, it is likely that
the current United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will eventually
collapse.
As fort the REDD+ bargaining, we assume that the North deliberates about an amount of transfer
to o⁄er to the South to avoid further deforesting. South cannot propose a price to prevent the self-
destruction of its forests and can only accept or refuse to comply with the mechanism proposed by
8the North. However, South can lie about the amount of the net loss BS(e￿
N;eS;t) it will incur by
joining the agreement and we assume that the reservation price of the South c, is imperfectly known
by North. This asymmetry is justi￿ed by the fact that c re￿ ects some ethical considerations which
it is not in South￿ s interests for North to know. South will su⁄er from the e⁄ects of climate change
but has other priorities such as developing. Moreover, historically, South is not responsible for the
global warming that currently occurs and it claims for compensations. It follows that it is naturally
di¢ cult to know South￿ s reservation price. Conversely, because of the large number of studies that
document the cost of climate change to the North, we assume that South has complete information
on North￿ s cost and bene￿t functions.
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Figure 1. The Game
9The game we examine is depicted in Figure 1. In the ￿rst period, North which already committed
to a climate policy o⁄ers a transfer ￿1 to South in return for halting deforestation. South either
accepts or rejects the o⁄er; if it accepts, the bargaining ends. The payo⁄s for the coalitions are then
respectively UN(￿1;1) = B ￿ ￿1 and US(￿1;1) = ￿1 ￿ c. If South rejects the o⁄er, the bargaining
continues and N makes a new o⁄er ￿2 at the next period. If agreement is achieved at the second
period, the payo⁄s to the coalitions will be UN(￿2;2) = ￿(B￿￿N￿￿2) and US(￿2;2) = ￿(￿2￿￿S￿c).
If bargaining ends in disagreement, both coalitions receive at best a zero payo⁄. We assume this is the
worst possible outcome and it implies by assumption that no coalition has an incentive purposefully
to strive for a disagreement.
The South coalition can be of high or low type. If low, South￿ s reservation price is low, and vice
versa. According to its type, the South coalition is denoted S￿ and S+ and the minimum transfer it
will accept is denoted by c￿ and c+; with c+ > c￿ > 0. North is not aware of South￿ s type. It does
not know the minimum transfer required for South to join the treaty; it knows only a probability
distribution which is common knowledge. We write p+
t to denote North￿ s subjective probability that
South￿ s type is high and p￿
t to denote North￿ s subjective probability that the South￿ s type is low,
and p￿
t = 1 ￿ p+
t : In the case that t = 2, the probability distribution [p￿
2 (￿1);p+
2 (￿1)]8 is conditional
on the fact that, in the ￿rst period, North o⁄ered a transfer ￿1 which South rejected.
The action set of the North is denoted by XN and corresponds to the set of feasible transfers from
North to South, XN 2 [0;B￿￿N￿￿S]: A pure strategy for N consists of a couple of actions (￿1;￿2(:))
where ￿1 2 XN is the transfer o⁄ered at the ￿rst period and ￿2(:) 2 XN; is the transfer o⁄ered at
the second period conditional ￿1 being rejected. A mixed strategy for N is a couple of actions
(￿1(XN);￿2(XN)) where the ￿0s are probability distributions over XN and where ￿2 is conditional
on the o⁄er being rejected in the ￿rst period of the game. South￿ s action set is XS = fa;rg, where
a denotes acceptance and r rejection of the o⁄er. A pure strategy for S is a couple of actions
8For readibility purpose, in some following equations we abuse notations and write p2 instead of p2(￿1):
10(s1(:);s2(:)) where s1 2 XS is the best reply to the o⁄er ￿1 of N at the ￿rst period and s2 2 XS is
the best reply to the o⁄er ￿2 of N at the second period, conditional on the o⁄er being rejected in
the ￿rst period. A mixed strategy (￿1 (XSjc;￿1);￿2 (XSjc;￿1;￿2)) for S is a couple of probability
distributions over XS; conditional on the transfers o⁄ered by North and the minimum acceptable
transfer level c:
3 Should the North wait and see?
Solving the game with incomplete information requires the use of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
By de￿nition, perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires that both types of South play optimally, that
whenever possible, North￿ s beliefs are determined using Bayes￿rule, and that North￿ s choices are
optimal given these beliefs. Formally, we de￿ne it as follows:
De￿nition 1 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game is a set of actions [￿1;￿2(:);s1(:);s2(:)]






that satisfy properties (1) and (2).
(1) The strategies [(￿1;￿2(:));(s1(:);s2(:))] form a Nash Bayesian equilibrium in each subgame
given the probability distribution of North;






are consistent with Bayes￿rule.
Note that there is a substantial experimental evidence that casts doubts on the relevance of sub-
game perfection for analysing several game situations including ultimatum games (e.g. Andreoni
and Blanchard 2006). Subjects in ultimatum games exhibit a preference for fairness which may be
a critical problem in the context of climate change negotiations. To argue whether perfect Bayesian
equilibrium is an appropriate concept in our setting would require a speci￿c experiment on a nego-
tiation that would account for the four features of our model: incomplete information, a deadline,
irreversible damages (i.e. melting ice cake) and discounting. Without conducing such an experiment,
we can only conjecture, but there is some related experimental ￿ndings that supports it. We know
11from experiments on melting ice cake negotiations that when information is complete and capital
depreciation is linear (as in our model), subgame perfection is consistent (Rapoport et al. 1990; Weg
and Zwick 1991). We know also from experiments on negotiations with incomplete information on
the receiver that perfect Bayesian equilibrium is relevant (Rapoport et al. 1995).9 One can conjecture
that it will be similarly relevant if we run an experiment that combines these two features, which
therefore exempts us from including fairness considerations in the utility functions. We believe that
this conjecture is all the more reasonable that the game we study is di⁄erent from a usual ultimatum
game setting in that in our model, North pays for a good that South sells which makes strategic
aspects more relevant than fairness.
3.1 The one-period game
Because the two-period game is solved by backward induction, we ￿rst study the second period game
when payo⁄s are not discounted. Notice ￿rst that when information is complete, coalition S￿ accepts
any o⁄er such that US(￿2;2) ￿ 0, and receives a minimum o⁄er ￿2 = c￿+￿S. Coalition S+; receives
￿2 = c+ +￿S. We deduce that in the second period game, pure strategies for North are c￿ +￿S and
c+ +￿S. As a consequence, we consider c￿ +￿S < c+ +￿S < B ￿￿N, the other cases being trivial.
This inequality means that if North makes a high transfer to South, it still achieves a positive bene￿t.
In other words, we focus on situations where there is always an agreement that Pareto-improves the
status quo.
Let us now study the second period game with incomplete information. North o⁄ers a transfer
level ￿2 given a probability distribution (p￿
2 ;p+
2 ). South either accepts or rejects the o⁄er and the
action s2(c;￿2) relies on South￿ s type and the amount of transfer o⁄ered.10
When North chooses the pure action ￿2 = c+ + ￿S, the agreement always comes into force and
9For an exhaustive discussion refer to Camerer (2003).
10In the case of a mixed action, ￿2 (XSjc;￿2), the probability distribution over XS is conditional on the minimum
acceptable transfer level and the amount o⁄ered.
12North￿ s expected payo⁄ is p+
2 (B ￿ c+ ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿S) + p￿
2 (B ￿ c+ ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿S) = B ￿ c+ ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿S.
When it chooses pure action ￿2 = c￿ +￿S, South rejects the o⁄er with probability p+
2 and the result
is that North￿ s expected payo⁄ is p￿
2 (B￿c￿￿￿N ￿￿S). We deduce that North prefers o⁄er c++￿S
to c￿ + ￿S when B ￿ c+ ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿S > p￿
2 (B ￿ c￿ ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿S). If we de￿ne the bound V such that:
V = (1 ￿ p+
2 )c￿ + p+
2 (B ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿S)
we can conclude that North o⁄ers c++￿S when c+ < V . It o⁄ers c￿+￿S when c+ > V and follows a
mixed strategy (￿;1￿￿) over fc￿ + ￿S;c+ + ￿Sg when c+ = V . South always accepts o⁄er c++￿S
and it accepts an o⁄er ￿2 < c+ + ￿S if the reservation price is low:These results are summarized in
the following lemma:





c+ + ￿S if c+ < V
￿(c+ + ￿S) + (1 ￿ ￿)(c￿ + ￿S) with ￿ 2 [0;1] if c+ = V
c￿ + ￿S if c+ > V
and South accepts the o⁄er with probability:
￿2 (s2jc;￿2) =
(
1 if ￿2 ￿ c + ￿S
0 else
The second period o⁄er relies on the magnitude of the maximum reservation price c+ relative to
three variables: the minimum reservation price c￿, the probability p+
2 about South￿ s type, and the
gains expected from the avoided deforestation if there is an agreement signed at the second period.
Note that given B ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿S > c￿, V is always increasing in p+
2 . The more North is pessimistic
about South￿ s type, the more likely it will make a higher o⁄er. V is also increasing in the expected
gross bene￿t from deforestation and in the minimum reservation price c￿. We deduce that the higher
the expected gains from treaty making and the smaller the reservation price corridor c+￿ c￿; the
likelier that the o⁄er will be c+ + ￿S because it guarantees an agreement at a low opportunity cost.
133.2 The two-period game
The principal feature of the two-period game is the possibility that North reveals the type of South by
making a small o⁄er ￿rst. Given the probability that South￿ s type is low, it is questionable whether it
would be worth North making a small o⁄er in the ￿rst period and, in case of non-agreement, o⁄ering
more in the second period. We consider the parameters such that p￿
1 (B￿c￿)+p+
1 ￿(B￿￿N￿c+￿￿S) 6=
B ￿ c+ which is the condition for agreement to possibly be delayed. We study cases where (1)
c+ < (1 ￿ p+
1 )c￿ + p+
1 B and (2) c+ > (1 ￿ p+
1 )c￿ + p+
1 B. Considering cost and bene￿t functions
de￿ned earlier, a South￿ s high reservation price means either that the e⁄ort eS to comply with an
agreement will be high, that South will give a low value to DS; or that a responsibility/equity bias
will lead the South to ask for a signi￿cant transfer in order to comply with this e⁄ort.
For North and as depicted in the lemma, cases (1) and (2) make the o⁄er conditional to the
expected bene￿ts from agreement, the uncertainty about reservation prices and the beliefs about
South￿ s type. Rubinstein (1985) would describe this as case (1) depicting a soft North and case (2)
a hard North. The main di⁄erence is that a soft North never makes a second period o⁄er that could
be rejected by the South while a hard North strives for the most favourable deal, even if it postpones
the agreement to a next negotiation period.
We ￿rst consider case (1) and analyse North￿ s o⁄ers. Suppose that there is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium such that a transfer at the ￿rst period is ￿1 2 [c￿;c+[: If ￿1 is rejected by South, then
North will update its beliefs according to Bayes￿rule:
p￿




￿￿1)=p(r) = ￿1 (rjc￿;￿1)p(c￿)=p(r)
where,
p(r) = ￿1 (rjc￿;￿1)p(c￿) + ￿1 (rjc+;￿1)p(c+) = ￿1 (rjc￿;￿1)p￿








1 + ￿1 (rjc+;￿1)p+
1






1 + (1 ￿ p￿
1 )
(1)
Observe from (1) that p￿
2 (￿1) ￿ p￿
1 when p￿
1 (1 ￿ p￿
1 )(1 ￿ ￿1 (rjc￿;￿1)) ￿ 0 which is always true.
By symmetry, we deduce p+
2 (￿1) ￿ p+
1 and given that the ￿rst period o⁄er was rejected, North will
update its priors in favour of a high type in the second period. Given that B ￿c￿ is always positive,
p￿
1 (B ￿ c￿) ￿ p￿
2 (￿1)(B ￿ c￿): By assumption, we have that c+ < (1 ￿ p+
1 )c￿ + p+
1 B which involves
B ￿ c+ > p￿
1 (B ￿ c￿). We can deduce, B ￿ c+ > p￿
1 (B ￿ c￿) ￿ p￿
2 (￿1)(B ￿ c￿) and given ￿N; ￿S
and ￿ are positive values, we have:
￿(B ￿ c+ ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿S) > p￿
1 ￿(B ￿ c￿ ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿S) ￿ p￿
2 (￿1)￿(B ￿ c￿ ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿S) (2)
The left hand term of inequality (2) is North￿ s expected discounted payo⁄ when it o⁄ers c+ + ￿S in
the second period. The right hand term is the expected discounted payo⁄ if it o⁄ers c￿+￿S instead.
We conclude that for any o⁄er ￿1 2 [c￿;c+[ rejected by South in the ￿rst period, North will always
o⁄ers c+ + ￿S in the second period.
Consider now the ￿rst period o⁄er and de￿ne by b ￿ the lowest transfer level accepted at the ￿rst
period by a S￿ coalition knowing that the lowest transfer o⁄ered in the second period is ￿2 = c++￿S.
We have b ￿ ￿ c￿ = ￿(c+ + ￿S ￿ c￿￿ ￿S) which means that South accepts the o⁄er b ￿ in the ￿rst
period if the expected payo⁄ is the same as the payo⁄ in the second period. We can deduce that
b ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)c￿ + ￿c+ and that South is of a low type if it accepts any o⁄ers ￿1 ￿ b ￿ and is of a high
type if it accepts any o⁄ers ￿1 ￿ c+. Given that South is fully informed, North is unable to modify
South￿ s belief by deviating from its best reply. Likewise, South never deviates from its best reply
since inverting its action in the ￿rst period will always worsen its payo⁄.
15Let us now examine whether North chooses b ￿ or c+ at the ￿rst period. De￿ne the mapping
f : R ! R such that f = ￿H ￿￿M = B ￿c+ ￿p￿
1 (B ￿b ￿)￿p+
1 ￿(B ￿￿N ￿c+ ￿￿S) where ￿H and
￿M stand for the payo⁄s resulting from the high and the median o⁄ers at the ￿rst period. Notice
that f = 0 when c+ = c+ = W +￿p+
1
￿N+￿S
1￿￿ with W = (1￿p+
1 )c￿ +p+
1 B. Given f is continuous and
strictly decreasing in c+, c+ < W and ￿p+
1
￿N+￿S
1￿￿ ￿ 0, f is always positive which proves that North
will always o⁄ers c+ in the ￿rst period. We can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If North is soft, there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. North o⁄ers c+ in
the ￿rst period and c+ + ￿S in the second period. Any type of South coalition accepts the ￿rst o⁄er
immediately.
Interestingly, this proposition shows that in some situations, the problem of timing might be
solved independently of the discount factor and the irreversible damages that would occur in the
case that cooperation is postponed. Immediate cooperation is reached thanks to a high North-South
transfer as soon as c+ < (1 ￿ p+
1 )c￿ + p+
1 B; that is, in three canonical situations:
- when North￿ s leeway B ￿ c+ for reaching an agreement immediately is high;
- when types c￿ and c+ are close and thus, when uncertainty has a low opportunity cost;
- when North is pessimistic about the type of South, i.e. when p+
2 is high.




Discounting and irreversible damage a⁄ect the decision as soon as this condition is not ful￿lled.
This is the situation depicted in case (2) and in order to categorize decision making we need to de￿ne
an additional bound that we calle ￿; the discount factor value making North indi⁄erent between o⁄ering
b ￿ and c￿ in the ￿rst period. Assuming ￿=￿N+￿S and Z = (2p+
1 ￿1)(B￿￿￿c+)+(1￿p+
1 )(c￿￿c+); we
have e ￿ =
p+
1 (B￿c￿)(B￿￿￿c+)
(c￿￿c+)Z , a bound that can be written also as e ￿ = h(p+
1 ;B;c￿;c+;￿) with #h
#￿ < 0.
16In a proof (provided in the appendix), we deduce the following two propositions11:
Proposition 2 If North is hard and if ￿ < e ￿ (i.e. ￿ > e ￿), there is a unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium: North o⁄ers ￿1 = b ￿ and ￿2 = c+ + ￿S. South accepts the ￿rst period o⁄er if it is of a
low type and otherwise accepts the second period o⁄er.
Proposition 3 If North is hard and if ￿ > e ￿ (i.e. ￿ < e ￿), there is a unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium: North o⁄ers ￿1 = c￿ and ￿2 = c￿ + ￿S. South rejects the two o⁄ers if it is of a high




1 (c+￿c￿) and always accepts the
second o⁄er if it is of a low type.
These propositions tell us that when the leeway (B￿c+) of the North is not su¢ ciently important,
when the corridor of uncertainty (c+ ￿ c￿) is high or when the North is optimistic that it will be
able to buy South￿ s cooperation at a low price, North may take the risk that agreement will be
postponed. We deduce that incomplete information introduces ine¢ ciency into the bargaining and
makes uncertainty a key factor explaining cooperation delay and negotiation failure. As stated in
proposition 3 and despite the fact that agreements are always Pareto-improving, this ine¢ ciency can
collapse the negotiations at the two periods ending the process on a disagreement. Cooperation can
fail despite the deadline in the case that South￿ s reservation price is high, that North is hard and
if over time, there is a small degradation to the bene￿ts from discounting and irreversible damages.
This is because given the uncertainty about South￿ s reservation price, North will prefer to sacri￿ce
chances of an agreement with a S+ coalition in order to bene￿t a good deal in case South￿ s reservation
price is low. As stated in propositions 2 and 3, ine¢ ciency may also delay agreement even if bene￿ts
decrease signi￿cantly over time (i.e. ￿ > e ￿ and ￿ < e ￿). In accordance with our intuition, the more
11Note that considering simpler utility functions (such that UN = B ￿￿ and US = ￿) and T negotiation periods with
T ! 1, Sobel and Takahashi (1983) obtain results that are consistent with our 2-periods model. However, in order to
obtain these results, they look at special types of equilibria rather than characterizing the entire set: they examine an
equilibrium that is the limit of ￿nite-horizon equilibria.
17that bene￿ts depreciate over time12, the higher will be the ￿rst period o⁄er. Finally, note that if
North is hard, a high o⁄er will systematically be discarded at the ￿rst period because North prefers
to take the risk of a negotiation failure in order to minimize the o⁄er.
We ￿nish this interpretation with a sensitivity analysis. Similar to Rubinstein￿ s (1982) complete
information model, when South￿ s discount factor decreases (i.e. South becomes impatient) we can
expect North￿ s welfare to increases and South￿ s welfare to decrease. We can check that the ￿rst
assertion is right but not the second. Because it is impatient, probability that South will accept o⁄er
b ￿ at the ￿rst period increases. The con￿guration moves from the equilibrium depicted in proposition
3 to the equilibrium depicted in the proposition 2. It follows that North o⁄ers b ￿ at the ￿rst period
and c++￿S at the second; the welfare of both coalitions increases in comparison with the equilibrium
resulting from o⁄ers c￿ at the ￿rst and c￿ + ￿S at the second period.
Note that the outcome resulting from o⁄ers (c￿;c￿ + ￿S) is always Pareto dominated by the
outcome resulting from o⁄ers (b ￿;c+ + ￿S): Both coalitions should always prefer the latter o⁄er
scheme. However, North knows that if it o⁄ers b ￿ at the ￿rst period, South may reject it in order
to receive c+ + ￿S at the next period. Incomplete information can involve ine¢ ciency and both
coalitions can end up in a worse situation than with complete information.
4 Discussion
What are the insights from this analysis? Recall that our principal aim was to examine strategic
bargaining in a North-South climate deal with asymmetric information in order to determine the
conditions ensuring agreement. Assuming negotiation with a deadline where the bene￿ts from coop-
eration decrease over time, we addressed two critical questions : which transfers should North o⁄er
to South and when? We studied the conditions for negotiation success, for negotiation delay and for
12Irreversible damage is likely to be the principal factor in depreciation, before discounting, the period of time we
consider being relatively small.
18negotiation failure.
First, we can derive insights into what conditions North￿ s ￿rst period o⁄er. If we consider the
current bargaining over deforestation, should North o⁄er substantial aid in order that South will halt
its deforestation or should it make a low o⁄er and risk a negotiation failure in the ￿rst negotiating
period? Figure 2 describes our principal ￿ndings on this question.
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Figure 2. The ￿rst-period o⁄er
Due to the irreversible damage that will occur over time and to the fact that coalitions discount
future bene￿ts, the intuition would be that North and South should secure cooperation immediately.
However, in some situations, North may make a lower o⁄er and risk disagreement in the ￿rst period.
The reason for trying a low o⁄er is that North does not know the reservation price of the South and
this uncertainty leads to ine¢ ciencies that explain a potential agreement delay. An important lesson
in relation to decision making and negotiations delay is that over time depreciation of the bene￿ts
due to future irreversible damage and to discounting, is second to the bene￿ts that North expects to
derive from cooperation and the uncertainty related to it. We observe that when North makes a high
o⁄er, this choice is independent of the discount factor and the over time bene￿t depreciation. A high
o⁄er ensures immediate cooperation and North makes this choice because the expected bene￿t from
19agreement making is high and the opportunity bene￿t of risking a negotiation delay is low. This
opportunity bene￿t is related to the probability that South will reject a lower o⁄er, and to the gap
between a low and a high reservation price. We can conclude that North makes a high o⁄er because
it is not worth taking the risk of postponing cooperation. In the opposite case, where it is worse
risking a delay, irreversible damage and discounting become key variables. We con￿rm that as soon
as the depreciation of bene￿ts over time is su¢ cient, North prefers median to small o⁄ers in order to
limit the risk of a rejection from South.
Second, we can derive insights into the role of uncertainty and negotiation delays. Because of
uncertainty about South￿ s type, North may propose a small or median o⁄er at the ￿rst negotiation
period, which may be rejected by South. In this case, cooperation is delayed to the next negotiation
period. Indeed, we know that with one-sided incomplete information, a low type South is interested
in persuading North that its demands are high. Therefore, its strategy consists of adopting high
type behaviour. But if discounting and irreversible degradation are not too high, North will have
an incentive in the ￿rst period to propose a median transfer which is always accepted by a low type
South and always rejected by a high type South. We can conclude that delay is a means for North
to determine the type of South.
Finally, we can derive insights about Pareto ine¢ ciencies and negotiation failures. An important
result from this study is that the two coalitions may fail to agree, despite the fact that agreements
are always Pareto improving. This is the case if South is of a high type and expects a high o⁄er and
North proposes a small o⁄er in order to ensure a good deal in the case that South will be of a low
type.
Note that with the speci￿cation of the utility functions considered in the paper, the irreversible
damage that will occur over time in the South is always supported by North. This damage might
also possibly make South more likely to join the agreement at a lower price in the second period,
20which would translate into the same model but with adding instead of substracting ￿S in the utility
function of South: In this case, North does not support the damage in the South but deduces it from
its second period o⁄er. If ￿N + ￿S remains positive all our results are robust. Otherwise, there is a
threshold to ￿N + ￿S such that North will o⁄er b ￿ at the ￿rst period if it is soft, and c￿ if it is hard.
In other words, North will make lower o⁄ers in the ￿rst period and South will have an incentive to
accept them. In this situation there will still be a positive probability that negotiations will succeed
and positive probability that they will fail.
To conclude, and following the suggestion of one of the journal referees, an interesting extension
of this work would be to include a third party that would act as mediator and would facilitate
negotiations. The question is how this third party could intervene. There are some hints in the
literature on this topic about various paths that might be followed (Compte et Jehiel 1995; Manzini
et Mariotti 2001; Wilson 2001; Ponsati 2004; Manzini et Ponsati 2006). For Compte and Jehiel
(1995), the mediator breaks deadlocks and his intervention relies on the history of the negotiation
process, each party being able to ask unilaterally for third party arbitration. For Manzini and
Mariotti (2001), arbitration intervenes only after consensus. For Ponsati (2004) and Manzini and
Ponsati (2006), the logic is distinct and the mediator o⁄ers transfers in order to facilitate negotiations.
Finally, in Wilson (2001), the mediator makes random propositions until agreement is reached. The
common denominator in all these approaches is that the mediator never imposes his point of view.
An interesting line of research is to investigate the objective function of an executive director in
negotiations such as those over global warming and to analyse how it a⁄ects the game. Acting as a
mediator, this executive director might in￿ uence the course of the negotiations and we believe this
is a topic that requires more analysis given the key role played by former executive directors Jan
Pronk, Jean Ripert and Raul Estrada in the making of the Kyoto protocol (Deplege 2005).
21Appendix
Proof of propositions 2 and 3 Because they are related, we present a common proof for
propositions 2 and 3. This proof proceeds in two steps.
Step 1. We start by characterizing the best response strategies and study the three cases: when
￿1 < b ￿; when b ￿ ￿ ￿1 < c+ and when ￿1 = c+.
Case 1. If ￿1 = c+; any type of South accepts the o⁄er in the ￿rst period, an agreement is
immediately reached and the North obtains B ￿ c+:
Case 2. If b ￿ ￿ ￿1 < c+, a coalition S￿ always accepts the o⁄er in the ￿rst period, ￿1 (ajc￿;￿1) =
1; a coalition S+ always rejects it, ￿1 (ajc+;￿1) = 0. In case that South rejects the o⁄er in the
￿rst period, the North knows with certainty that the South is a coalition S+ and therefore o⁄ers
a transfer c+ + ￿S in the second period, which is always accepted. The payo⁄ for North then is
p￿
1 (B ￿ ￿1) + p+
1 ￿(B ￿ ￿N ￿ c+ ￿ ￿S) and is maximum when ￿1 = b ￿:
Case 3. If c￿ ￿ ￿1 < b ￿ , coalition S+ always rejects the o⁄er in the ￿rst period, ￿1 (ajc+;￿1) = 0.
Let ￿ be the value of ￿1 (ajc￿;￿1) such that the North is indi⁄erent between o⁄ering c+ + ￿S and
c￿ + ￿S in the second period when ￿1 (ajc+;￿1) = 0.
The North updates its beliefs in the second period over the type of S. We have:
p￿
2 (￿1) =
[1 ￿ ￿1 (ajc￿;￿1)]p￿
1





























(B ￿ ￿N ￿ c￿ ￿ ￿S)
and therefore we have:
￿ = 1 ￿
p+
1 (B ￿ ￿N ￿ c+ ￿ ￿S)
p￿
1 (c+ ￿ c￿)
We can prove now that in this case, a S￿ coalition always adopts the mixed strategy ￿ in the
22￿rst period.
First note that if North o⁄ers ￿2(￿1) = c+ + ￿S; its expected payo⁄ in the second period is
p￿
2 (￿1)(B￿￿N￿c+￿￿S)+p+
2 (￿1)(B￿￿N￿c+￿￿S) = B￿￿N￿c+￿￿S. If it o⁄ers ￿2(￿1) = c￿+￿S,
its expected payo⁄ is p￿
2 (￿1)(B ￿ ￿N ￿ c￿ ￿ ￿S) = (1 ￿ p+
2 (￿1))(B ￿ ￿N ￿ c￿ ￿ ￿S).
We can deduce that North adopts c+ + ￿S with probability 1 in the second period only if B ￿
￿N ￿c+ ￿￿S > p￿
2 (￿1)(B ￿￿N ￿c￿ ￿￿S) and therefore if ￿1 (ajc￿;￿1) > ￿. North adopts c￿ +￿S
with probability 1 in the second period only if ￿1 (ajc￿;￿1) < ￿ and adopts a mixed strategy which
we denote [1 ￿ ￿2(￿1);￿2(￿1)] o⁄ering c+ + ￿S with probability ￿2(￿1) if ￿1 (ajc￿;￿1) = ￿:
Second, note that if North o⁄ers c+ + ￿S in the second period, a coalition S￿ anticipates it and
rejects any ￿rst period o⁄er strictly lower than b ￿. It follows that for ￿1 2 [c￿;b ￿[ ; ￿1 (ajc￿;￿1) = 0,
which contradicts the previous statement. Similarly, if coalition S￿ anticipates that North will o⁄er
c￿ + ￿S in the second period, it should accept any o⁄ers ￿1 2 [c￿;b ￿[ in the ￿rst period, which also
contradicts the ￿rst statement. We can deduce that the only feasible alternative is that a coalition
S￿ always adopts a mixed strategy ￿ in the ￿rst period which ful￿ls our claim.
Given that a S￿ coalition plays a mixed strategy ￿ 2 ]0;1[ in the ￿rst period, ￿ is such that
the expected payo⁄ from accepting or rejecting o⁄er ￿1 is the same. We then have: ￿1 ￿ c￿ =













is maximum when ￿1 = c￿: We can deduce that given that North o⁄ers c￿ in the ￿rst period, it never
o⁄ers c+ + ￿S in the second period because ￿2(￿1) = 0: The o⁄er in the second period is ￿2(￿1) =
c￿+￿S. At equilibrium North o⁄ers ￿1 = c￿ and ￿2 = c￿+￿S. A coalition S￿ accepts the o⁄er with
probability ￿ in the ￿rst period and always accepts the o⁄er in the second while a coalition S+ always








23Step 2. We next study the ￿rst period o⁄er, that is the conditions for North to o⁄er c￿;b ￿ or c+.
We can deduce from proposition 1 that North prefers to o⁄er b ￿ rather than c+ as soon as c+ > c+.
We start by proving that in the case W < c+ < c+, North o⁄ers b ￿ or c￿ rather than c+. Consider
the mapping g : R ! R with
g(￿) = ￿H ￿ ￿L = B ￿ c+ ￿ p￿






￿(B ￿ ￿N ￿ c￿ ￿ ￿S)
and where ￿H and ￿L denote respectively North￿ s payo⁄s when the ￿rst period o⁄er is high or low.






1 )2(￿￿1)(B￿￿N￿c￿￿￿S) . Given




1 (c+￿c￿) ; note that ￿ ￿ 0 if and only if c+ ￿ ￿p￿
1 c￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿p￿
1 )B ￿ 0 which is
always true. We can deduce that ￿ is always negative and it follows that for any admissible ￿ 2 [0;1];
g(￿) < 0 and North always prefers the strategy (c￿;c￿ + ￿S) to strategy (c+;c+ + ￿S). North never
makes a high o⁄er at the ￿rst period.
Next, we show that the choice for North to play either b ￿ or c￿ relies on the degradation of
bene￿ts over time. De￿ne the mapping ￿ : R ! R with ￿ = ￿M ￿ ￿L and notice that ￿ = 0 when
￿ = e ￿ =
p+
1 (B￿c￿)(B￿￿N￿c+￿￿S)
(c￿￿c+)Z with Z = (2p+
1 ￿ 1)(B ￿ ￿N ￿ c+ ￿ ￿S) + (1 ￿ p+
1 )(c￿ ￿ c+) and
e ￿ ￿ 1. De￿ne " 2 R such that ￿ = e ￿ + " and note that ￿ = Z". We next consider the two cases
where p+
1 ? 1=2
First, consider the case where p+
1 < 1=2 and note that in this case e ￿ > 0 because Z < 0: We can
deduce that ￿ is positive when " < 0 and negative when " > 0: The median o⁄er is chosen as soon
as ￿ < e ￿:
Second, consider the case where p+
1 > 1=2, a priori Z can either be positive or negative. We can
prove that given c+ > W. Note that given p+











which is always true since
by assumption, ￿N + ￿S ￿ 0 and p+
1 > 1=2. We can deduce that c+ > e c and therefore Z < 0. We
conclude that ￿ is also positive as soon as ￿ < e ￿ which completes the proof. ￿
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